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Far (extrapersonal) and near (peripersonal) spaces
are behaviorally deﬁned as the space outside arm-
reaching distance and the space within arm-reaching
distance. Animal and human studies have shown that
this behavioral distinction corresponds in the brain to
a composite neural architecture for space representa-
tion. In this paper we discuss how the activation of the
neural correlates of far and near space can be modu-
lated by the use of tools that change the effective spa-
tial relationship between the agent’s body and the tar-
get object. When subjects reach for a far object with a
tool, it is possible to show that far space is remapped
as near. We shall also argue that space remapping may
not occur when far space is reached by walking in-
stead of using a tool. © 2001 Academic Press
INTRODUCTION
Neurophysiological studies in animals have shown
that near and far space (behaviorally deﬁned as the
space within and beyond arm’s reach) are coded in
different brain areas and by different neural mecha-
nisms. Area 8 of the monkey frontal lobe, implicated in
the coding of saccades (e.g., Bruce and Goldberg, 1985),
has been proposed to be involved in far space represen-
tation. Colby et al. (1996) showed that neurons in area
LIP (that is richly connected with, and physiologically
similar to, area 8) may be another neural substrate for
the representation of far space in monkeys. Near space,
on the other hand, seems to be represented in frontal
area 6 and in the rostral part of the inferior parietal
lobe, area 7b (Leinonen et al., 1979) and area VIP
(Colby et al., 1993; Duhamel et al., 1997). While far
space neurons are primarily visual, neurons coding
peripersonal space (i.e., the space in which there can be
direct interaction between the object and the body)
often have bimodal receptive ﬁelds, visual and tactile.
Some “peripersonal” neurons ﬁre both when a tactile
stimulus is delivered to the animal’s skin and when a
visual stimulus is presented in the space near the part
of the body where the tactile ﬁeld is located (Fogassi et
al., 1996; Gentilucci et al., 1988; Graziano and Gross,
1995; Graziano et al., 1994). The representation of
peripersonal space seems therefore to rely on an inte-
grated bimodal system of stimulus representation.
A practical consequence of this distributed neural
system for space representation is that damage to a
single brain area can cause, in monkeys, unawareness
for stimuli presented in a speciﬁc and restricted sector
of space (Rizzolatti and Gallese, 1988). For instance,
ablation studies, have shown that lesions of monkeys’
frontal eye-ﬁelds (area 8) cause inattention for stimuli
presented contralateral to the brain damage (Latto and
Cowey, 1971) especially in far space (Rizzolatti et al.,
1985). By contrast, lesions of area LIP can cause inat-
tention for stimuli presented near the monkeys’ body
and face (Rizzolatti et al., 1983).
CODING OF FAR AND NEAR SPACE IN HUMANS
The ﬁrst question we can ask is whether, also in
humans, space awareness is achieved by the joint ac-
tivity of many different brain areas coding different
spatial attributes of external stimuli. If so, one may
advance the hypothesis that a discrete lesion of the
human brain might impair awareness for stimuli pre-
sented in a speciﬁc sector of space, as in monkeys.
Neglect patients, who show impairments in the detec-
tion of stimuli contralateral to the brain damage, sim-
ilar although more complex, than those described in
monkeys, are usually tested in near peripersonal
space. However, based on the behavior of the patients
in everyday life, it has often been assumed that un-
awareness of stimuli is not limited to the space sur-
rounding the body, but extends to include all the space
visible by the subject. This clinical assumption seemed
to be conﬁrmed by Pizzamiglio et al. (1989), who inves-
tigated the possibility of a dissociation between near
and far space neglect in a group of right-brain damaged
patients. Using a purely perceptual task, they did not
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All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.ﬁnd any evidence in favor of the existence of such a
dissociation. Halligan and Marshall (1991), however,
presented the ﬁrst evidence for a possible distinction
between near and far space coding in man. They de-
scribed a patient with a marked neglect in a line bisec-
tion test, when the task was executed in near space by
means of either an ordinary pen or a projection light-
pen. However, when the patient was asked to bisect
lines in far space by means of a projection light-pen,
neglect was greatly reduced or even disappeared. This
ﬁnding demonstrated, for the ﬁrst time in humans,
that unawareness for stimuli can be restricted to a
speciﬁc sector of space. The ﬁnding of the opposite
dissociation (more severe neglect in far space than in
near space) conﬁrmed that, also for humans, far and
near space can be separately coded by the brain (Cowey
et al., 1994, 1999; Vuillemieur et al., 1997) Interest-
ingly, a recent PET study has conﬁrmed the anatomi-
cal distinction between near and far space coding in
humans (Weiss et al., 2000).
The studies just reviewed demonstrate that neglect
in man shows aspects that are similar to those de-
scribed in monkeys, especially in tasks that are not
purely perceptive. In the experiment by Pizzamiglio et
al. (1989), where neglect for both far and near space
was always present, the task did not require any kind
of explicit movements to be accomplished. The judge-
ment about the stimuli could be given even without (or
with minimal) ocular movements. On the contrary, in
the studies reported by Halligan and Marshall (1991),
Cowey et al. (1995), and Vuillemieur et al. (1997), the
task always involved a visuo-motor skills that might be
expected to map onto a spatial representation dedi-
cated to actions typically performed when the stimuli
are in far or near space respectively. In other words,
one may advance the hypothesis that the activation of
near and far space representation (and consequently,
the awareness for stimuli presented in deﬁnite sectors
of space) is not merely dependent upon the computa-
tion of the reaching distance, but may, at least to some
degree, be modulated by speciﬁc actions performed in
near or far space.
SPACE REPRESENTATION AND ACTION
In everyday life, both animals and humans need to
reach for objects around them. Depending on the dis-
tance away of a given object, different types of action
are afforded. For instance, if the object of interest is
close to the body (in near/peripersonal space), manual
reaching may be performed. If the object is beyond
manual reach (in far/extrapersonal space) two differ-
ent possibilities are available. The subject can use a
tool to reach for a far object, or he/she can reach the far
object by locomotion. To accomplish such tasks success-
fully, the brain must (a) compute the distance of the
object from the agent’s body correctly and (b) activate
the maps for near and far space representations appro-
priate to the computed distance. A question we can ask
is how the brain establishes what is far and what is
near. One possibility is that far and near are exclu-
sively distinguished by the distance that the hand can
reach in space. If this is the case, the distinction be-
tween far and near space would be based solely on
depth computation (here intended as the extraction of
the visual parameters necessary for the processing of
the objects distance). When the distance between the
body and the stimulus is perceived as such that the
hand can reach the stimulus, then the stimulus is
coded as near (near space maps are activated). When
the stimulus is perceived as lying outside the reach of
the hand, then it is coded as far (far space maps are
activated). The distinction between near and far space
would be, within one subject, very neat and rigid. An-
other possibility is that coding of spatial positions is a
more dynamic operation, not only related to the com-
putation of the absolute distance between the body and
the stimulus, but also related to the execution of spe-
ciﬁc actions in space. Iriki et al. (1996) showed, in
monkeys, that the activation of far and near space
maps can be inﬂuenced by the use of tools when the
action modiﬁes the spatial relation between the body
and the object. They found in the monkey parietal lobe
bimodal neurons that coded the schema of the hand,
similar to those studied by Rizzolatti and co-workers
(Fogassi et al., 1996; Gentilucci et al., 1988) and by
Graziano et al. (1994). As already discussed, these neu-
rons ﬁre when a tactile stimulus is delivered to the
monkey’s hand and when visual objects are presented
near the hand tactile receptive ﬁeld. The most striking
characteristic described by Iriki et al. (1996) was that
the visual receptive ﬁeld of the bimodal neurons could
be modiﬁed by a purposeful action. Indeed, when the
monkeys reached for far objects with a rake the visual
receptive ﬁeld was enlarged to include the entire
length of the rake and to cover the expanded accessible
space. The authors explained their results by postulat-
ing that during the reaching movement the tool was
assimilated to the animal’s hand, becoming part of the
hand representation (e.g., Aglioti et al., 1996). The
space now reachable by the prolongation of the hand
was enlarged, including part of what had previously
been far space, and the spatial relation between the
body and the object is modiﬁed by the action of reach-
ing-with-a-tool. As a consequence, far space was
remapped as near and the neurons that ﬁred for near
space also ﬁred when what had previously been coded
as far space was reached by the rake.
This modulation of space coding can also be shown in
humans. We asked a group of right brain-damaged
patients with neglect, a group of right brain-damaged
patients without neglect, and a group of neurologically
intact subjects to perform a line bisection task both in
near (lines placed 50 cm from the body) and far (lines
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length in near space could be either 10 cm (short lines)
or 20 cm (long lines). Line length in far space was
corrected for the visual angle and was either 20 cm
(short lines) or 40 cm (long lines). In this way, short
lines in near and far space and long lines in near and
far space covered the same angle at the retinal level. In
near space, the patient had to bisect the line either by
touching the midpoint of the line with the index ﬁnger
of the right hand (reaching modality) or by indicating
the midpoint of the line by means of a projection light-
pen (pointing modality). In far space, the patient had to
bisect the lines either by using a 100-cm stick (reaching
modality) or by means of a projection light-pen (point-
ing modality). The dependent variable was the dis-
placement errors in mm. Line length did not show any
signiﬁcant effect on performance and the results are
therefore presented collapsed for line length. As shown
in Fig. 1, both right brain-damaged patients without
neglect and normals were accurate in indicating the
line midpoint both in far and near space, in the point-
ing and in the reaching modality. The neglect patients
as a group did not show any dissociation in the perfor-
mance carried out in near and far space. They only
showed a signiﬁcant rightward displacement in all con-
ditions, with pointing being, if anything, more im-
paired than reaching. As in the study of Pizzamiglio et
al. (1989), the tendency in the group of neglect patients
was to show approximately the same grade of neglect
both in near and far space. No differential action mod-
ulation on near versus far space representation was
manifest.
However, with the same paradigm, Berti and Fras-
sinetti (2000) showed in a right brain-damaged patient
(with a dissociation between near and far space ne-
glect) that, when the cerebral representation of body
space was extended to include objects or tools used by
the subject for a purposeful action, the space previously
mapped as far was then treated as near, like in mon-
keys. Patient PP had a clear neglect in near space in
many different tasks including line cancellation, read-
ing and line bisection. Line bisection in near space was
affected by neglect both when the patient had to per-
form the task by a reaching action with the index ﬁnger
of the right hand, and when she had to point with the
projection light-pen. When the lines were positioned
far from the body neglect was much less severe or even
absent when tested using the projection light-pen (see
Fig. 2). This result is very similar to that described by
Halligan and Marshall (1991) and, again, shows that
far and near space can be differently affected by brain
damage. However, in Berti and Frassinetti’s experi-
ment, the patient was also asked to bisect lines in far
space using a stick through which the patient could
reach the line. Under this condition, neglect appeared
also in far space and was as severe as neglect in near
space. We explained this result by reference to the
neurophysiological data reported by Iriki et al. (1996):
as in monkeys, the use of a tool extended the body
space, thus enlarging the peripersonal space up to in-
clude all the space between the patient’s body and the
stimulus. Far space was, as a consequence, remapped
as near—i.e., the representation for near space coding
was activated. Because near space representation was
affected by neglect, neglect became manifest also in far
space.
Having shown that the activation of space represen-
tation can be modulated by actions that change the
subject’s effective spatial relationship to a target ob-
ject, another question we asked is whether a similar
remapping occurs also when far space is reached not by
using a tool but by locomotion (Berti et al., submitted).
Neglect patients and brain-damaged patients without
neglect were asked to perform two bisection tasks: one
FIG. 1. Bisection performance of a group of seven right-brain-damaged patients without neglect (RBD-N2), a group of eight right-brain-
damaged patients with neglect (RBD-N1), and a group of nine neurologically intact subjects (normals).
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projection light-pen, the other was a bisection of a
doorway by walking through it. The two tasks were
performed at (or starting at) three different distances
from the target (3, 1.5, and 0.5 m). We found three
neglect patients who showed more severe neglect in far
than in near space. Based on this observation, we pre-
dicted that if the representation of space is up-dated
during walking, our neglect patients should activate an
impaired representation at the beginning of each walk-
ing path and a less impaired, or unimpaired, represen-
tation toward the end of it, in the two longer distance
conditions. Therefore, their walking trajectories should
deviate at the beginning of each path, especially with
the most distant starting point, but as they approached
the doorway, with the activation of better preserved
space representations, the walking trajectories should
be corrected. As a consequence, the passage through
the doorway (i.e., the actual displacement error) should
be similar from all three starting point conditions. On
the contrary, if space is not up-dated, then the ﬁrst
representation that is activated, at the beginning of
each path, will be the one responsible for the ﬁnal
bisection performance. Therefore, if spatial neglect is
more severe in far than in near space, we should expect
to ﬁnd worse performance with the starting point in far
space (activation of far space) than with the starting
point in near space.
As already mentioned, in the pointing modality, the
three neglect patients showed a more severe neglect in
far than in near space. In the walking task these pa-
tients also tended to cross through the doorway to the
right of its objective midpoint and with a greater devi-
ation when the starting point was in far space. Accord-
ing to our prediction we interpreted these results as
evidence that—at least for short, linear trajectories—
these patients did not up-date the spatial position
of a far target object during locomotion. The location of
the far object is coded at the beginning of the move-
ment, and the error in the bisection computation is
generated within the ﬁrst representation that is acti-
vated.
Although the absence of space remapping in the lo-
comotion task might be due to neglect patients’ re-
duced attentional/representational capacities, it can
also be explained by the necessity (both in brain dam-
aged people and in normals) of constructing a stable
representation of the spatial position of the object that
otherwise would be continuously changed as the sub-
ject passes, during walking, across different sectors of
space. In the case of tool use, on the contrary, the
switch in spatial coding occurs before the action begins,
once the brain has coded the tool as an extension of
personal space. It is reasonable to suppose that up-
dating during walking may become necessary for dis-
tances greater than those we used, or when a rapid
change in some characteristic of the target, or a per-
turbation in the walking trajectory, is introduced dur-
ing the subject’s walking.
CONCLUSIONS
Neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies
have shown many similarities between animals and
humans in the brain mechanisms of space coding. Both
single cell recordings and lesion studies have revealed
FIG. 2. Patient PP9 bisection performance as a function of space and modality. Reproduced, by permission of MIT Press, from Berti and
Frassinetti (2000).
S101 FAR AND NEAR SPACE CODINGthat the neural systems dedicated to space represen-
tation and spatial cognition are implemented in a dis-
tributed network where discrete brain areas are de-
voted to the coding of the different spatial attributes of
the stimulus (Rizzolatti and Berti, 1993). This network
is not simply based on perceptual operations, but is
greatly modulated by the programming of purposeful
actions that modify the spatial relation between the
subject and the external world. Purposeful actions
seem to have effects on the activation and modulation
of space representations especially when there is a
change in the spatial extension of the agent’s body, as
in tool using.
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